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In this article I will discuss some discursive and narrative approaches to the study of  
emotions in fi rst person narratives. I will start by focusing on discursive psychology 
and notions of  Derek Edwards, Rom Harré, and Grant Gillett and continue intro-
ducing two narrative theorists, Alan Palmer and Dorrit Cohn and their approaches 
to the construction of  fi ctional minds. I will discuss Cohn’s model of  consonant and 
dissonant self-narration and give the reader an example how the model can be used 
in analyzing a narrative about a supernatural experience. 
Let us begin by asking what emotion is. I consider Keith Oatley’s defi nition 
of  emotion useful for this article: “An emotion is a psychological state or process 
that functions in the management of  goals. It is typically elicited by evaluating an 
event as relevant to a goal; it is positive when the goal is advanced, negative when the 
goal is impeded” (Oatley 1999, 273).  One can distinguish emotional states based on 
their duration: a conscious emotion lasts minutes or hours, and a mood has similar 
bases to an emotion but lasts longer. When they last even longer, they can be seen 
as dispositions and personality traits, which last for years or even a lifetime. (Oatley 
1999, 273–275.) Both shorter and longer emotions are signals to ourselves and ot-
hers. They steer people towards things they evaluate as worthwhile in their projects 
and away from what would be deleterious. They are also signals to others since even 
though people can not notice inner feelings of  each others, they notice the emotions. 
(Oatley 2004, 16.)  
Emotions, their origins and their expressions can be approached from several 
directions, for example biological, neurophysiological, philosophical and cognitive. I 
consider the social-constructionist approach most suitable for my research. According 
to this approach, culture determines what emotions can be expressed and what kinds 
of  expressions are acceptable. In addition, culture infl uences which situations lead to 
particular emotions. The social-constructionist approach to emotions does not reject 
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the idea that there is at least some innate component in emotions, but it emphasizes 
that each culture has its own evaluations that call forth emotions and its own emotions 
that match its social practices. (Johnson-Laird & Oatley 2000, 467–472.)
DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND EMOTIONS
When discussing the narrative construction of  emotions, I draw on ideas from the 
fi eld of  discursive psychology, which deals with how people talk about emotions, 
how they use emotion categories when talking about things, and how emotional 
discourse performs social actions. From this perspective emotions should not be 
thought of  merely as physiological reactions to stimuli nor abstract entities but as 
actual moments of  emotional feelings and displays in a defi nite cultural setting. Each 
vocabulary expresses a local taxonomy and theory of  emotions, an emotionology, 
that is, the way people identify, classify and recognize emotions. According to Harré 
and Gillett, three different topics are addressed in emotion vocabularies: moral (e.g. 
“jealousy”), aesthetic (e.g. “delight”), and prudential (e.g. “dread”). Emotion displays 
and feelings are discursive acts, based on bodily reactions but meanings defi ned by 
their role in the discursive interactions of  members of  particular culture. (Harré and 
Gillett 1994, 148, 160–161.) Thus, according to Derek Edwards, “Emotion discourse 
is an integral feature of  talk about events, mental states, mind and body, personal 
dispositions, and social relations” (Edwards 1997, 170). Discursive psychology is 
broadly compatible with social constructionist work. No clear distinction is made 
between emotion ‘discourse’ and emotions ‘themselves’. What emotions are is relative 
to what emotions are taken to be, how they are conceptualized, talked about, and 
interpreted. Emotions ‘themselves’ are socially and historically defi ned. (Edwards 
1997, 179–180.)
Discourse of  emotions refers to the use of  verbal formulae for actions, fee-
lings and motives, with regard to interpersonal judgments and attitudes, located within 
local moral orders of  authority and responsibility. Edwards notes that a key feature 
of  emotion discourse is its deployment inside narrative and rhetoric. Emotion terms 
emerge not only as unique descriptions of  certain acts or reactions, but as parts of  
interrelated sets of  terms that implicate each other in narrative sequences and rheto-
rical contrasts. Both narrative sequences and rhetorical contrasts are ways of  talking 
about how discourse performs social actions at the moment of  its production. These 
social actions include: constructing the sense of  events, orienting to normative and 
moral orders, to responsibility and blame, and social evaluation. Emotion categories 
should not be considered merely as individual feelings or expressions. Neither is their 
discursive deployment reducible to a kind of  detached, cognitive sense-making. Ed-
wards concludes that emotion categories are discursive phenomena and need to be 
studied as such, as part of  how talk performs social actions.  (Edwards 1997, 187.)
In order to suggest how emotion discourse works in stories, Edwards pre-
sents a set of  rhetorical positions and contrasts that can structure narrative discourse. 
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For example, emotions can be seen irrational versus rational; cognitively grounded 
and/or cognitively consequential; event-driven versus dispositional; passive reaction 
(unaccountable feelings) or controllable actions (what you accountably do); internal 
states (private feelings) versus external behaviour (expressions); spontaneous versus 
externally caused; honest versus faked and natural versus moral emotions. (Edwards 
1997, 193–194.)
EMOTIONS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF FICTIONAL MINDS
I extend Edwards’ work by synthesizing his account with Alan Palmer’s research on 
the importance of  the emotions in the construction of  fi ctional minds. I am referring 
to his book Fictional Minds (2004). Palmer is a narratologist who situates himself  in 
post-classical narratology that rethinks and recontextualizes classical models for nar-
ratological research.  In particular, he emphasizes the need to examine how fi ctional 
minds work within the contexts of  the storyworlds to which they belong. For Palmer, 
narrative fi ction means the presentation of  fi ctional mental functioning. Although 
Palmer focuses on the fi ctional mind, he uses real-mind discourses to investigate 
fi ctional minds. He notes that in addition to philosophy such as the philosophy of  
mind as well as the philosophy of  action, his study makes use of  other real-mind 
disciplines such as cognitive science, psychology, and psycholinguistics. Though 
Palmer acknowledges that his study is aimed primarily at specialists in literary theory 
in general and narrative theory in particular, he says he also tries to be helpful to 
scholars in other fi elds. (Palmer 2004, 4–8.)
Palmer argues the importance of  the emotions in any analysis of  the whole 
of  the fi ctional mind. He notes that a lot of  research has been done within narrative 
theory of  fi ctional consciousness, but very little specifi cally on the emotions. He 
states that emotion is one of  the more obvious ways in which our thoughts can be-
come public. In general, Palmer examines how the fi ctional minds of  characters are 
constructed by the narrator and the reader. That construction is essential, because 
narrative is the description of  fi ctional mental functioning. (Palmer 2004, 12–26, 115.) 
He writes: “Readers create a continuing consciousness out of  the isolated passages 
of  text that relate to a particular character. In this way, we assemble what I call an 
embedded narrative: the whole of  a character’s various perceptual and conceptual 
viewpoints, ideological worldviews, and plans for the future considered as an individual 
narrative that is embedded in the whole fi ctional text.” (Palmer 2004, 15.)
For Palmer, the whole mind includes emotions, as well as other functional 
aspects. “Emotions, cognitions, goals, action, context and so on, they all fl ow into 
one another until, the distinctions are diffi cult to maintain”, Palmer states (Palmer 
2004, 117). The whole mind is a social mind too, since thoughts take place in a social 
context of  action and interaction with other. The thoughts have purposive nature: 
They have motives, intentions, and they result in behavior and action. Palmer sees 
the thought report as the most suitable mode of  presenting thoughts of  the fi ctive 
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characters because most characters’ thoughts take place in a social context of  action 
and interaction with other. (Palmer 2004, 14–16, 77.) Thought report is the mode 
that Dorrit Cohn calls psycho narration in 3rd person narration and self-narration 
in 1st person narration. Palmer argues that thought report is especially suitable for 
presenting emotions, and he shows that analyzing thought report enables us to see 
that feelings are visible and public; emotions are inextricably linked with cognition; 
presentation of  emotion plays a vital part in the creation of  character and emotion 
passages have important teleological value. (Palmer 2004, 81, 113.)
Dorrit Cohn, considered to be one of  the founders of  contemporary poetics, 
is Ernest Bernbaum Professor of  Literature at Harvard University. She is the author 
of  Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction (1978), The 
Distinction of  Fiction, (1999) and of  numerous articles on narrative poetics. In her book 
Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction Cohn examines 
techniques for portraying the mental lives of  fi ctional characters in the stream-of-
conscious novel as well in other fi ction. She states that though her discussion of  the 
modes for rendering consciousness will be more literary than linguistic in its attention 
to stylistic, contextual, and psychological aspects, she takes linguistic criteria for her 
starting-point in naming and defi ning three basic techniques (Cohn 1978, 11). These 
narrative modes for presenting consciousness in third-person context are psycho-
narration (the narrator’s discourse about a character’s consciousness), quoted mono-
logue (a character’s mental discourse) and narrated monologue (a character’s mental 
discourse in the guise of  narrator’s discourse). In fi rst-person text psycho-narration 
becomes self-narration, and monologues either self-quoted, or self-narrated. She 
also names a fi rst-person form of  its own: autonomous interior monologue. (Cohn 
1978, 14, 17.) 
According to the model proposed by Cohn, the relationships between the 
narrating self  and the experiencing self  in fi rst-person narratives can be placed on a 
sliding scale between dissonance and consonance. In the dissonant mode, the wise, 
distant and discursive self, the narrating self  (narrating I), can move back and forth 
in time, turn back to past self/selves, contradict, explain, evaluate and analyze the 
thoughts, statements and actions of  the experiencing self  (experiencing I) and add 
information and opinions regarding past events. This narrating self  sees the diffe-
rence between ideals and realities, and moves between effects and causes. Opposite 
to this dissonant self-narration is the consonant self-narration where the narrating 
self  reports what happened while adopting a vantage-point that is very proximate 
to experiencing self, and where it can even be diffi cult to distinguish between the 
experiencing self  and the narrating self  at all. Event may be focalized exclusively 
through the experiencing I, leading to an almost complete backgrounding of  the 
narrating I. In consonant self-narration the psychological distance between experi-
encing and narrating selves is narrow and the narrating I does not draw attention to 
his/her opinions, judgments and hindsight. There is no self-exegesis, as Cohn puts 
it. (Cohn 1978, 145–158.)
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HOW COHN’S MODEL CAN BE USED WHEN EXAMINING THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS AND EMOTIONAL SELF IN 
NARRATIVES?
My study, in general, examines how the supernatural has been constructed both as a 
revitalized and stigmatized cultural category and how people in contemporary Finland 
telling about supernatural experiences recognize and combat the stigmas related to the 
supernatural. It discusses the question of  how supernatural, scientifi c and religious 
discourses intermingle and how certain kinds of  knowledge and narratives become 
authoritative. I collected the material in Finland, in 2003–2004, and it consists of  ap-
proximately 470 fi rst-person retrospective accounts of  encounters with supernatural 
beings such as angels, extraterrestrials, demons, ghosts and guardian spirits. Letters 
and e-mails were sent to me as responses to my inquiries published in newspapers. In 
the inquiry I asked people to answer such questions as “how did it feel to encounter 
a supernatural being?” and “how does it feel now when remembering the event?” 
The word supernatural refers here to an experience that the person considers as out 
of  the ordinary world, mysterious or miraculous.
One possible approach to my research could be to examine the kinds of  
functions that descriptions of  emotions serve in narratives about encounters between 
human beings and supernatural beings. In more detail, what kinds of  emotions are 
related to supernatural experiences; how are the causes, states and consequences of  
these emotions constructed; how are the emotions used in the construction of  nar-
rating and experiencing selves, as well as other characters and narrated events and; 
how can we deal with the private/public distinction in public expressions of  private 
experiences? 
Here I present an example of  how Cohn’s model can be used to examine 
the narrative construction of  emotions in written fi rst-person factual narratives 
about supernatural experiences focusing attention on how this construction of  an 
emotional self  works in synergy with the sliding scale of  consonant and dissonant 
self-narration. The excerption below is from a letter sent to me by a woman, born in 
1959. I will present it in English here and the original Finnish version is in Appendix. 
Translation is my own. 
Emphasis on narrating I: 
[..] In January 1998 it happened that my brother was taken to the hospital and I 
told them that I can not come home since I had just started going to a computer course. 
Since I had already taken care of  my things and their things, I continued joining the 
course. My brother and mother got angry and I had never felt worse than then. I was so 
afraid of  what would happen back home but I didn’t back off. There were no options, 
not anymore. My brother got his chance to let it go now that he didn’t need to carry 
the burdens related to mother and home, and he died in two weeks. Our home that 
had been inhabited by our family nearly 100 years was suddenly empty. My mother 
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was sad, angry and very bitter in the nursery home close to our home. [..] It was the 
very rare moment when I thought, “I’m not going to get through this”. [..] 
Emphasis on experiencing I: 
About one week after my brother’s death and a week before the funeral, I was sitting 
on the couch in the morning, telephone in my arms, and listing things that I had 
already taken care of  and things that I needed to take care of. Suddenly, I became 
conscious that there is SOMETHING on the left, about one and half  meters away. 
[..] IT reached the ceiling, it was about one meter wide, like a solid pillar and IT 
emanated huge power, peace and trust. IT was very old, at least thousands of  years, 
and very wise. IT walked with me for the next 6-7 weeks all the time. [..] I trusted 
it completely, from the fi rst moment on: I wasn’t alone anymore and everything would 
work out just fi ne. [..] After 6-7 weeks I realized one day IT is gone. [..] I under-
stood, accepted it and thanked IT aloud for the visit and the help and I was sure I 
was never going to feel myself  weak again. 
Emphasis on narrating I: 
I have lived a real human life after that, with all the sorrows and delights, feeling strong 
sometimes and weak sometimes! I have called IT many times when I have felt like 
being lost but IT doesn’t come. You see: IT doesn’t need to come. I am not lost, I am 
just lazy! [..] Now I just need to believe! And I do believe; I remind myself  time to 
time about IT, and that thought gives me a huge feeling of  strength and peace. [..] 
In this narrative a supernatural experience works as a turning point of  emotional life, 
and emotion discourse focuses on differences between the previous self  and the cur-
rent self. In Cohn’s words, this is an example of  dissonant self-narration. Throughout 
the whole letter the wiser analytical self  moves back and forth in time, observes and 
explains the experiencing self  and her development from worrying type of  a person 
to a more relaxed person. This is also a good example of  how emotions take place in 
social context and in interaction with others. In the beginning of  the letter narrating I 
emphasizes the background of  the supernatural experience. She explains how she had 
to take care of  her mother and brother and the home, and how everything collapsed 
when her brother died. When she thought that she is not going to get through this, 
she met a being that appeared in the form of  a pillar, an encounter that she briefl y 
focalizes through experiencing I. She trusted in this pillar, her spiritual guide that is, 
survived the responsibilities, found inner peace and became a strong, relaxed, self-
confi dent person, evaluated through narrating I. 
Both experiencing I and narrating I present various emotions. Narrating I 
begins the story by constructing the family-related, externally caused emotions: her 
fear on the one hand, and anger, sadness and bitterness of  her mother and brother 
on the other hand. Experiencing I switches the focus on the actual encounter with 
the spiritual guide and the resulting certainty that she is never going to feel herself  
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weak again. Narrating I returns and says she has felt both strong and weak, but 
emphasis the positive emotions of  strength and peace that were the results of  the 
encounter. Narrating I also connects belief  and emotion: The positive emotions stay 
if  she believes in the existence of  the spiritual guide. Thus believing maintains the 
changes in personality traits. Though this example includes emotion talk, it is worth 
remembering that emotional descriptions are optional.
SUPERNATURAL AND EMOTIONS: DEALING WITH DEVALUED 
CATEGORIES
The supernatural is a category that breaks the general scheme of  the modern western 
world and the order the world is supposed to possess. As David Hufford has pointed 
out, Protestant Christianity and Enlightenment skepticism have greatly infl uenced 
the way people consider the natural and the supernatural. On one hand, science roo-
ted in the Enlightenment promotes the scientifi cally based explanations of  natural 
phenomena and rejects the supernatural since it contradicts the natural laws. On the 
other hand, the religious organizations following the heritage of  Protestant Refor-
mation maintain the split between believing and observing. (Hufford 2005, 26.) The 
suppression, in the form of  devaluing, continues and is constructed in different kinds 
of  structures of  social life. Supernatural experiences and experiencers are stigmati-
zed, and narrators recognize that. Narrators may address the potential challenges by 
negotiating or denying the questions of  hallucinations and mental health, illusions, 
dreams, and social status. 
Emotions too are held to belong to the realm of  body, irrational, unconscious, 
unintentional and uncontrolled – that is, to the devalued side of  cultural categorization. 
(White 1993, 31.) When constructing a narrative about one set of  devalued experiences 
(the supernatural), why mention another devalued category (the emotions)? Perhaps 
because I asked them? Still, would not it be better to brush aside the irrational, the 
emotion descriptions? Here Edwards reminds us that “emotions are not just irrational, 
they are an integral part of  rational accountability” (Edwards 1997, 194). Emotion 
descriptions can provide a contrast to rational thought but also a rationally sensible 
story of  coherent and understandable reactions (Edwards 1997, 171).  
Finally, the fact that narrators chose to share their supernatural experiences 
with a folklorist can be viewed as a decision to enter the public realm and the public 
debate on the reality of  supernatural experiences. Both the emotions felt during 
the event and afterwards are portrayed as coherent and understandable reactions to 
supernatural experiences.  This construction of  emotion becomes the proof  they 
offer up to the debate. For it is one thing to argue against the reality of  a supernatural 
vision but quite another thing to contest someone’s emotional reactions to such an 
experience.  
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APPENDIX
[..]Tammikuussa 1998 se tilanne sitten tuli, että veli tarvitsi välitöntä sairaalahoitoa, 
ja minä ilmoitin, etten tule apuun kotiin; olin juuri aloittanut atk-kurssin ja koska 
olin jo järjestänyt niin omat kuin heidänkin asiansa, vein suunnitelmani täytäntöön. 
Äiti suuttui, veli suuttui, minulla oli pahempi olo kuin milloinkaan sydän kylmänä 
pelkäämässä, mitä kotona tapahtuu, mutta en perääntynyt. Vaihtoehtoja ei ollut, ei 
enää. Veli sai luvan luovuttaa päästyään kantamasta äidin ja kotipaikan asioita, 
ja kuoli parin viikon kuluttua. Liki 100 vuotta sukumme asuttama maapaikka 
oli äkkiä tyhjillään ihmisistä. Äiti oli vihaisena, suruissaan ja erittäin katkerana 
hoivakodissa, aika lähellä kotipaikkaa. [..] Tuli se harva kerta eteeni, että tuuma-
sin itselleni: ”Minä en selviä tästä.” [..] Noin viikon kuluttua veljen kuolemasta ja 
viikkoa ennen hautajaisia istuessani sohvalla puhelin sylissä viivaamassa yli tehtyjä 
asioita ja kirjoittamassa uusia tehtäviä, siis aamupäivällä, havahduin äkkiä huo-
mioon, että noin puolentoista metrin päässä minusta, etuvasemmalla, on JOKU. [..] 
SE oli kattoon asti pitkä, noin metrin levyinen, kuin hyvin jykevä pilari, ja SE 
huokui ja säteili valtavaa voimaa, rauhaa ja luottamusta. SE oli erittäin vanha, 
vähintään tuhansia vuosia, ja kaikkitietävän viisas. SE kulki mukanani seuraavat 
1,5 kuukautta, 6-7 viikkoa siis, joka hetki. [..] Luotin siihen ensi hetkestä alkaen 
täydellisesti: en ollut yksin ja kaikki asiat menisivät ehdottomasti kuin pitää. [..] 
Noin kuuden-seitsemän viikon kuluttua eräänä päivänä tajusin, että SE on poissa. 
[..]Ymmärsin, hyväksyin, kiitin SITÄ ääneen käynnistä ja kaikesta avusta, ja olin 
aivan varma, etten ikinä enää elämässäni tunne itseäni voimattomaksi. Ihan oikeaa 
ihmiselämää olen elänyt senkin jälkeen iloineen ja suruineen, voimaintunnossa ja 
epätoivon alhossa! Olen monta kertaa kutsunut SITÄ, kun tunnen olevani hukassa, 
mutta ei SE tule. Katsos: SEN ei tarvitse. Minä en ole hukassa, vaan pelkästään 
laiska! [..] Nyt pitää vain uskoa! Ja minä uskon; muistutan itseäni aika-ajoin 
SIITÄ ja saan aina valtavan rauhan ja voiman tunteen ajatuksesta. [..] 
REFERENCES
COHN, DORRIT 1978: Transparent Minds. Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness 
in Fiction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
EDWARDS, DEREK 1997:  Discourse and Cognition.  London: Sage Publications.
HARRÉ, ROM & GILLETT, GRANT: The Discursive Mind. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications.
HUFFORD, DAVID J. 2005: Sleep Paralysis as Sprititual Experience. –  Transcultural 
Psychiatry, 42(1): 11–43.  
JOHNSON-LAIRD, P.N & OATLEY, KEITH 2000: Cognitive and Social Construc-
tion of  Emotions. – Lewis, Michael &  Haviland-Jones, Jeanette M (eds.), Handbook 
of  Emotions. New York: The Guilford Press.[1993.]
KIRSI HÄNNINEN
9
OATLEY, KEITH 1999:  Emotions – Wilson, Robert A & Keil, Frank C (eds.), The 
MIT Encyclopedia of  Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
PALMER, ALAN 2004:  Fictional Minds.  Lincoln: University of  Nebraska Press.
WHITE, GEOFFREY M. 1993: Emotions Inside Out: The Anthropology of  Affect. 
– Lewis, Michael &  Haviland-Jones, Jeanette M. (eds.), Handbook of  Emotions. New 
York: The Guilford Press.
MA Kirsi Hänninen is a Ph.D student at the Ohio State University, Department 
of  Comparative Studies, and a folklore graduate student at the University 
of  Turku. She is a student participant in Project Narrative at the Ohio State 
University. 
